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Comments
Creation of Life: A New Frontier
for Liability?-
"at times, human ingenuity -seems unable to controlfully the forces it
creates--that, with Hamlet, it is sometimes better, 'to bear those ills we
have than fly to others that we know not of."1
Within the last ten years, scientists have begun to "create" life in a
process known as recombinant deoxyribose nucleic acid molecule re-
search.2 The research, more popularly known as DNA research or ge-
netic engineering, involves cutting strands of DNA molecules and
recombining the cut portions into one new DNA structure.3 The new
DNA structure is then inserted into a cell or microorganism in an at-
tempt to have that cell or organism do something it previously was not
capable of doing or to perform its usual activities more efficiently.4
DNA research has been expanding at a rapid pace. Scientists are fore-
casting important breakthroughs in a number of fields as a result of this
research.5 Along with this increased activity has come an increasing
amount of public attention.6
1. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).
2. The National Institutes of Health define recombinant DNA molecules as
either (i) molecules which'are constructed outside living cells by joining natural or syn-
thetic DNA segments to DNA molecules that can replicate in a living cell, or (ii) DNA
molecules that result from the replication of those described in (i) above.
45 Fed. Reg. 6724 (1980). See generally Anderson & Fletcher, Gene Therapy in Human Beings:
When is it Ethicalto Begin?, 303 NEw ENG. J. OF MEDICINE 1293, 1294 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Anderson & Fletcher]; Baker & Clough, The Technological Uses and Methodology of Recombinant
DNA, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1009 (1978); Cline & Mercola, The Potentials of Inserting New Genetic
Information, 303 NEW ENG. J. OF MEDICINE 1297 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Cline & Mercola];
Comment, Genetic Manpulation" Research Regulation and Legal Liability Under International
Law, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Genetic Man4ulation]; Note, Recombi-
nant DN.4 and TechnologicalAssessment, 11 GA. L. REV. 785 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Recombi-
nant DNA].
3. See 45 Fed. Reg. 6724 (1980); Genetic Manipulation, supra note 2, at 206-07 & n.18; Re-
combinant DNA, supra note 2, at 791-93.
4. See Genetic Manipulation, supra note 2, at 206-07; Recombinant DNA, supra note 2, at
791-93.
5. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 31, 1980, at 4, col. 1; Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1980, at 48, col. 1;
see, e.g., Genetic Manipulation, supra note 2, at 206-07 n.16; Fletcher, Ethics and Recombinant
DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1131, 1137 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher].
6. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, May 31, 1981, §D, at 1, col. 2; May 29, 1981, at 1, col.
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The attention generated regarding genetic engineering has been fo-
cused on the potential benefits that have been predicted for DNA re-
search. Scientists have been forecasting breakthroughs in the fields of
medicine, food production and environmental cleanup that will result
from their research.7 The optimism shown by the scientific community
has attracted a great deal of interest in the financial community as the
financiers see the potential for large profits resulting from these devel-
opments.8 While only a few of the potential breakthroughs have mate-
rialized as of the writing of this comment, the scientific and financial
communities remain optimistic about the future of DNA research.
There is, however, opposition to genetic engineering which, in gen-
eral, advances two arguments. One position is that it is neither morally
nor ethically proper for man to attempt to modify life or to alter God's
plan.9 The other argument against genetic engineering is that the activ-
ity is not safe and presents a significant threat of injury both to the
present population and to mankind in the future."° The United States
Supreme Court in the landmark patent case of Diamond v.
Chakrabary,l l though implored to do so,' 2 refused to address the pos-
sible risks stating that "[tlhe grant or denial of patents on microorga-
nisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or its attendant
risks. . .[nor] will [it] deter the scientific mind from probing into the
unknown any more than Canute could command the tides."'13
Thus, it seems as if recombinant DNA research will continue and
will increase in both scope and size. 4 With an increasing amount of
5; April 26, 1981, §A, at 6, col 1; April 25, 1981, at 30, col. 1; April 6, 1981, at 54, col. 1; April 5,
1981, §D, at 2, col. 2; Jan. 15, 1981, at 18, col. 3; Jan. 14, 1981, at 16, col. 2; Jan. 13, 1981, at 48, col.
1; Dec. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 6; Dec. 23, 1980, at 6, col. 3; Dec. 23, 1980, at 19, col. 3; Dec. 18, 1980, at
27, col. 4; Dec. 4, 1980, at 12, col. 3; Dec. 4, 1980, at 1, col. 6; Oct. 31, 1980, at 4, col. 1; Wall St. J.,
May 5, 1981, at 25, col. 4; Jan. 14, 1981, at 16, col. 2; Dec. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 6; Dec. 23, 1980, at 19,
col. 3; Dec. 18, 1980, at 27, col. 4; Dec. 4, 1980, at 12, col. 3.
7. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1137;
Genetic Manpulation, supra note 2, at 208-09; Recombinant DNA, supra note 2, at 792-93.
8. See, eg., San Francisco Chronicle, May 31, 1981, §D, at 1, col. 2; April 26, 1981, §A, at 6,
col. 1; April 6, 1981, at 54, coL 1; Dec. 4, 1980, at 37, col. 5; Oct. 31, 1980, at 4, col. I; Wall St. J.,
May 5, 1981, at 25, col. 4; Jan. 14, 1981, at 16, col. 2; Dec. 23, 1980, at 19, col. 3; Dec. 18, 1980, at
27, col 4; Dec. 4, 1980, at 12, col. 3.
9. This argument ultimately requires a personal decision and is, therefore, beyond the scope
of this comment. See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1133-34; Recombinant DNA, supra note 2, at 793
n.33. See also Anderson & Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1293-94 where the authors discuss ethical
practices in general among the scientific community.
10. See generally Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1135; Friedman, Health Hazards Associated with
Recombinant DNA Technology Should Congress Impose Liabilit, Without Fault?, 51 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 1355 (1978); Recombinant DNA, supra note 2, at 793.
11. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
12. Id at 316-17.
13. Id at 317.
14. See id; Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1133; Grobstein, Regulation andBasic Research: Impli-
cations afRecombinant DN'A, 51 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1181, 1196 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Grob-
stein]. See generali 45 Fed. Reg. 28909 (1980) (approvals for large scale experiments to be
conducted by Eli Lilly Co. and Genentech, Inc.).
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activity the danger of an accident will also escalate. 15 As a result, a
need exists for a framework of liability in the event of personal injury
or property damage.
This comment will address the applicability of California strict lia-
bility principles to genetic engineering "accidents." Two theories of
strict liability will be advanced to apply to a hypothetical genetic engi-
neering accident. The first is based on the premise that genetically cre-
ated microorganisms can be deemed animals with known vicious or
dangerous propensities. 6 The second theory will propose that DNA
research is an abnormally dangerous activity according to the Restate-
ment of Torts as applied in California.17 In addition, the comment will
show that the obstacle of proving causation may be overcome by a
careful application of evidentiary principles established by the Califor-
nia courts. Finally, the suggestion will be made that DNA research
carried on by state sponsored laboratories should not be protected by
sovereign immunity and should, therefore, be subject to the same lia-
bility as the private laboratories engaged in this type of research.
Before launching into an analysis of the applicability of strict liabil-
ity, a hypothetical accident scenario will be proposed. Because genetic
research involves a wide spectrum of different host cells and microorga-
nisms and includes work with bacteria, animal and plant cells,"8 "[i]t is
not difacult to construct scenarios in which injury could result."19
However, this discussion will be limited to a small range of accident
situations in which a genetically engineered microorganism, capable of
replication and produced in a laboratory by a scientist, escapes either
through the air or water, in an experimental carrier, such as a mouse,
15. The Guidelines of the National Institutes of Health, in fact, differentiate between large
scale and small scale experiments because "the probability of escape from containment barriers
normally increases with increasing scale." 45 Fed. Reg. 6724 (1980).
16. See, ag., Clowdis v. Fresno Flume & Irrigation Co., 118 Cal. 315, 320, 50 P. 373, 374
(1897); Williams v. River Lakes Ranch Dev. Corp., 41 Cal. App. 3d 496, 501-02, 116 Cal Rptr.
200, 204-05 (1974); Talizin v. Oak Creek Riding Club, 176 Cal. App. 2d 429, 437, 1 Cal. Rptr. 514,
518 (1959); Heath v. Fruzia, 50 Cal. App. 2d 598, 600, 123 P.2d 560, 562 (1942). Seegeneraly 4 B.
WrTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, §794 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as WrrKN]; CAL. Jun., Animals, §§71-76 (3d ed. 1973).
17. See, eg., Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489,499, 190 P.2d 1, 7 (1948); Green v. General
Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 333-34, 270 P. 952, 954-55 (1928); Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion
Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137 (1967); Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d
638, 645, 295 P.2d 958, 961 (1956); Beck v. Bel Air Properties, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 841, 286
P.2d 503, 508-09 (1955). See also RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs §§519, 520 (1938).
18. See, eg., 46 Fed. Reg. 16452, 17994 (1981); 45 Fed. Reg. 3552, 6718, 7182, 24968, 25366,
28904, 50524, 55924, 61874 (1980). These pages contain applications for permission to carry out
various experiments. The genetically engineered creations have been placed in different insects,
mice, and, in at least two situations, human beings, Anderson & Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1294-95;
Cline & Mercola, supra note 2, -at 1298-99.
19. 41 Fed. Reg. 38427 (1976) cited in Recombinant DNA, supra note 1, at 856.
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an insect, or a laboratory worker.2 ° It will be hypothesized that once
outside the laboratory, the microorganism will infect a person or group
of people or cause damage to crops or livestock. The injured party will
then institute legal proceedings against the individual researcher, and
the laboratory, private or public, that employs that scientist, seeking
damages for the injury suffered. This comment, however, will not ad-
dress any situation involving negligent, wilful, or improper disposal of
modified organisms; any situations involving commercial production
and distribution of genetically engineered microorganisms; 21 or any ex-
perimental or medical applications of genetic research in human be-
ings.2 2 Instead, this comment will focus on the availability of the
principles of strict liability to an injured party.
THE APPLICATION OF STRICT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES
The doctrine of strict liability originated in the English case of Ry-
lands v. Fletcher.23 That case held a landowner liable without regard to
fault for damage caused by the escape of a non-natural accumulation
of water from his land onto his neighbor's property.24 Modernly, the
principles of strict liability are applied in situations when an owner
possesses an animal with known vicious or dangerous propensities; 25 in
situations involving activities when there is a risk of harm that cannot
be removed by the exercise of reasonable care;26 and, most recently, in
cases involving defectively manufactured products.27 Strict liability is
used most often when the risk of harm is great and the proof of causa-
20. See Genetic Manipulation, supra note 2, at 204-05 where the following hypothetical is set
up for an international situation:
Suppose that a scientist in a technologically advanced nation was to isolate what he
believed to be the genetic information that causes normal cells to reproduce at an accel-
erated rate, resultin& in malignant tumor growth. If this scientist should become careless,
the isolated germ might escape the confines of the laboratory. A common abuse of labo-
ratory procedure would permit the minute particule to be flushed down a laboratory sink
before its reproductive process was disarmed. Since the sewer system very probably
would harbor close relatives of the escaped germ, the propagation of deadly organisms
would be expedited, resulting in instant contamination of the waterways .... Once un-
leashed into the waterways or atmosphere, the irrevocable path of a self-procreating
germ would be devastating and unlimited.
21. At the present time there is no commercial production of genetically modified, useful
micro-organisms. There are, however, indications that commercial production will become feasi-
ble in the near future. See Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1981, at 10, col. 3.
22. While this comment does not address this situation, clinical research on humans, using
insulin interferon, and synthetic growth hormones produced by genetically engineered micro-or-
ganisms, has begun. See San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 4, 1981, at 4, col. 4; Wall St. J., Mar. 16,
1981, at 10, col. 3; Jan. 15, 1981, at 18, col. 4.
23. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 505
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; WITKIN, supra note 16, at §798.
24. 3 H.L. at 338. See generally PROSSER, supra note 23, at 496; WiTKIN, upra note 16, at
§798.
25. See generally PROSSER, supra note 23, at 496; WITKI , supra note 16, at §794.
26. See generally PROSSER, supra note 23, at 505-16; WrrIN, supra note 16, at §799.
27. See generally PROSSER, supra note 23, at 656-57; WiTKIN, supra note 16, at §809. This
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tion is difficult.2 8 Arguably, genetic engineering is such an activity.
The nature of the risks involved in genetic engineering, however, is
very much in dispute.29 This section will apply the principles of strict
liability to the genetic engineering accident scenario by characterizing
the engineered organisms as animals with known, dangerous propensi-
ties.30 Additionally, strict liability will be applied by characterizing
DNA research as an abnormally dangerous activity.31
A. DN4-modffed Organisms as Animals with Dangerous Propensities
California law provides that the owner of a wild animal is liable for
injuries caused by that animal regardless of the amount of care exer-
cised by the owner.32 An owner is also liable for injuries caused by an
animal, in his control, with known dangerous or vicious propensities33
and for damage resulting from the trespass of livestock.34 While at first
comment does not address products liability as a theory for recovery since no genetically engi-
neered product has reached the market. See note 21 supra.
28. See generally Prosser, supra note 23, at 494.
29. See 45 Fed. Reg. 61874 (1980). There appear to be two widely divergent viewpoints
regarding the risks involved in recombinant DNA research. One viewpoint, the so-called "worse
case" theory, maintains that genetic research poses a serious threat of a catastrophic epidemic.
Basically, this argument derives from the fact that the basic carrier, the bacteria Escherichia colt, is
a common inhabitant of the human intestinal tract which can be easily absorbed into the human
system. Once in the body, E.coi has the ability to easily exchange genetic material with other
cells causing any variety of reactions. See generally Genetic Manipulation, supra note 2, at 207
n.19, 208; Recombinant DN4, supra note 2, at 793 n.33.
In addition, science has established that bacteria pose the greatest risk of infection in humans.
This tends to lend support to the above position. See generally Grobstein, supra note 14, at 1183-
84; McGarity, Contending 4pproaches to Regulating Laboratory Safety, 28 U. KAN. L. REv. 183,
190-93 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McGarity].
On the other hand, most of the researchers involved in this DNA research judge the risk as
minimal or nonexistant-at a level roughly equal to that of infectious disease research that has
been carried out for a number of years. This must be tempered by the realization that infectious
disease and virus research has resulted in a number of accidents and subsequent illnesses even
though the researchers involved had exercised due care. See generally Fletcher, supra note 5, at
1135-36; McGarity, supra, at 190-93; Genetic Manipulation, supra note 2, at 205.
Finally, it should be noted that scientists themselves have pointed out that their knowledge of
cells and how they work is exceedingly elementary and there is a possibility that the introduction
of new cells will interfere with the normal functions of the host cell. They have also acknowl-
edged that the introduction of some beneficial cells may also bring undesired and possibly lethal
cells into the host organism. See generally Anderson & Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1296; San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Dec. 3, 1980, at 6, coL 2.
30. See note 16 supra.
31. See note 17 supra.
32. See, e.g., Gooding v. Chutes Co., 155 Cal. 620, 624-25, 102 P. 819, 821 (1909); Opelt v. Al
G. Barnes Co., 41 CaL App. 776,779, 183 P. 241, 242 (1919). See generally WITKIN, supra note 16,
at §794; CAL. JUR., 4nimals, §§71-76 (3d ed. 1973).
33. See, e.g., Clowdis v. Fresno Flume & Irrigation Co., 118 Cal. 315, 320, 50 P. 373, 374
(1897); Talizin v. Oak Creek Riding Club, 176 Cal. App. 2d 429,437, 1 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (1959);
Heath v. Fruzia, 50 Cal. App. 2d 598, 600, 123 P.2d 560, 562 (1942).
34. See Williams v. River Lakes Ranch Dev. Corp., 41 Cal. App. 3d 496, 501-02, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 200, 204 (1974). See generally WrrI N, supra note 16, at §794A. This comment does not
specifically address trespassing livestock although a unique argument could be made based on the
definition of livestock in the Williams opinion. In that case the court defined livestock to include:
"[all animals] normally susceptible of confinement within boundaries without seriously impairing
their utility and the intrusion of which upon the land of others normally causes harm to the land
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glance these theories appear to have no applicability to a discussion of
genetic engineering, a closer examination will reveal that they are in-
deed appropriate frameworks for a cause of action brought because of
a genetic engineering accident.
The term "animal" in California law refers to all animal life other
than man and, in general, signifies an inferior or irrational sentient be-
ing capable of voluntary or self-motion.35 Much genetic research is
conducted on mice and other small animals and insects, 36 all of which
clearly fit within this definition. The bulk of the research, however, is
conducted using bacteria.37 The commonly accepted definition of
"bacteria" classifies bacteria as a plant species. 38 There are, however,
certain characteristics of bacteria, primarily mobility, that are consis-
tent with the California definition of an animal. Since bacterium is
non-human, animate and capable of independent motion, it would
qualify as an "animal" under California law. Once this is established,
the theories of strict liability governing animals become available to a
plaintiff injured by a genetic engineering accident.
1. Wild Animals
The first of these theories provides that an owner of a wild animal
will be held strictly liable for injuries caused by that animal while in
the owner's possession.39 The courts presume that wild animals are
dangerous. 40 Whether microorganisms converted by genetic engineer-
ing can be considered wild animals depends on whether courts will
broadly or narrowly define "wild animal."
By one definition, a wild animal is an animal which is not by custom
devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the place in which
it is kept.41 On the other hand, Webster's dictionary defines "wild" as
or to crops thereon." 41 Cal. App. 3d at 502 n.3, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 204 n.3. These genetically
engineered micro-organisms are normally confined within containment barriers, either naturally
or artificially created, see 45 Fed. Reg. 6724 (1980) (prescribing containment levels), and carry out
their functions therein. If they were to escape from those barriers and intrude upon someone's
land it appears that this would normally cause harm to that land, the crops thereon, or any person
thereon. See note 29 supra.
35. See CAL. JUR.,Animals, §1 (3d ed. 1973). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (5th ed.
1979) which defines animal as "[n]on-human, animate being which is endowed with the power of
voluntary motion. Animal life other than man."
36. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 3552, 6718, 7182, 24968, 25366, 28904, 50524, 55924, 61874 (1980);
Anderson & Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1294-95; Cline & Mercola, supra note 2, at 1298.
37. See Grobstein, supra note 14, at 1183; Genetic Manpulatlon, supra note 2, at 207.
38. WEBSTERs NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 82 (8th ed. 1979).
39. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 501-02, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05; Baugh v. Beatty, 91 Cal. App. 2d 786,
791, 205 P.2d 671, 674 (1949); Opelt v. Al G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776, 779, 183 P. 241, 242
(1919). See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §507 (1938).
40. See Gooding v. Chutes Co., 155 Cal. 620, 623, 102 P. 819, 821 (1909); 91 Cal. App. 2d at
791, 205 P.2d at 674; 41 Cal. App. at 779, 183 P. at 242. See generally WITKIN, supra note 16, at§794.
41. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §506(1) (1938). Although California has not explicitly adopted
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"growing or produced without the aid and care of man."42 Under the
Webster's definition, the microorganisms converted by genetic engi-
neering are not wild animals since they are produced with the aid of
man.43 The Restatement of Torts definition, which is much broader
than the Webster's definition, could include microorganisms since they
are "not by custom devoted to the service of mankind."'  While this
would result in a finding that the microorganisms themselves are
"wild," this would not provide an answer regarding the nature of the
manmade microorganism. The question has not been addressed by any
court but it seems that the imposition of man's control would remove
these genetically-altered microorganisms from the definition of a wild
animal. Therefore, this theory of liability apparently provides no
assistance.
2. Animals with Dangerous Propensities
The second theory of strict liability for animals holds an owner liable
for the injuries caused by a domestic animal in his control with known
vicious or dangerous propensities.45 The California courts require a
finding that the "person in control knew or should have known that the
animal had such a propensity" before strict liability will be imposed.46
The courts do not necessarily allow an animal the proverbial "one bite"
before its owner is said to have knowledge of the animal's dangerous
propensity. Instead, the courts require the owner to be aware of the
dangerous tendencies of the animal.47 Thus, if the owner knows or
should know through the exercise of reasonable care that the animal
has dangerous propensities, strict liability may be applicable. 48 More-
over, it is the knowledge of the dangerous propensity, not the manner
in which the animal is kept, that gives rise to the liability.49
When applying this theory to DNA research, the dangerous propen-
sities of genetically engineered microorganisms must be ascertained.
this provision, it has held the following to be "wild animals": Exparte Bailey, 155 Cal. 472, 101 P.
441 (1909) (fish); Exparte Kenneke, 136 Cal. 527, 69 P. 261 (1902) (quail); Garcia v. Gunn, 119
Cal. 315, 51 P. 684 (1897) (wild goats); People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374
(1897) (fish); Kellog v. King, 114 Cal. 378, 46 P. 166 (1896) (game birds); 91 Cal. App. 2d 786, 205
P.2d 671 (chimpanzees); 41 Cal. App. 776, 183 P. 241 (leopards).
42. WEBsTE 's NEW COLLEGATE DICTIONARY 1330 (8th ed. 1979).
43. See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
44. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §506, Comment a (1938). Compare RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS §506(1) (1938) with WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 1330 (8th ed. 1979).
45. See, ag., Williams v. River Lakes Ranch Dev. Corp., 41 Cal. App. 3d 496, 501-02, 116
Cal. Rptr. 200, 204 (1974); Talizin v. Oak Creek Riding Club, 176 Cal. App. 2d 429, 437, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 514, 518 (1959).
46. 176 Cal. App. 2d at 437, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 518 (emphasis added).
47. Id at 437, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18.
48. Id
49. Opelt v. Al G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776, 779, 183 P. 241, 242 (1919).
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The dangerous attributes inherent in DNA modified organisms derive
from the nature of the basic host cell used, the bacteria Escherichia coli
(commonly known as E. coli), and the ability of bacteria to infect easily
the human system." The introduction of genetically altered microor-
ganisms into the human body is likely to cause a variety of reactions
within the body, some of which may prove to be lethal. 1 In addition,
evidence from virus and infectious disease research has established that
there is a risk of escape and subsequent infection despite the best efforts
of the scientists involved 2.5  Thus, genetically created microorganisms
do pose a risk to human health; 53 scientists, even though they minimize
the risk54 should be charged with knowledge of the dangerous propen-
sities of genetic research. 5 As a result, even though scientists are care-
ful about containing these organisms, if an organism escapes, liability
should attach for any injuries caused thereby under principles of strict
liability.
Before an owner may be held strictly liable for damage caused by an
animal, however, California law requires that the injury be within the
type of harm that normally occurs when a dangerous animal is in-
volved.56 This does not require that one type, or a limited number, of
injuries be assigned to each animal, but that the harm be within the
scope of the risk created.5 7 Since these principles of causation are
equally applicable to all theories of strict liability, they will be dis-
cussed in a separate section below. 58 First, an alternative framework
for strict liability, one based on abnormally dangerous activities will be
considered.
B. The Applicabii4y of the Doctrine of Abnormaly
Dangerous Activi y
California courts adopted the principles of strict liability for injuries
caused by an abnormally dangerous activity in 1928:
50. See note 29 supra.51. Anderson & Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1296; San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 3, 1980, at 6,
col. 2.
52. See McGarity, supra note 29, at 190-93. See also Genetic Manipulation, supra note 2, at
205 where it is pointed out: "The incidence of laboratory produced-infections, 5000 in the past
thirty years, suggests that the eventual escape of such an organism can be expected." But see
Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1136.
53. See note 29 supra.
54. Grobstein, supra note 14, at 1184.
55. See, eg., Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 99, 272 P.2d 26, 30 (1954); Kersten v.
Young, 52 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 125 P.2d 501, 504 (1942) (imposing a duty on livery stablekeepers to
inform themselves of the habits and disposition of horses kept for use).
56. Williams v. River Lakes Ranch Dev. Corp., 41 Cal. App. 3d 496, 499, 507, 116 Cal. Rptr.
200, 202, 208 (1974). See PRosseR, supra note 23, at 498.
57. See 41 Cal. App. 3d at 506-07, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
58. See text accompanying notes 117-163 infra.
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Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful
and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known conditions,
and, with knowledge that injury may result as to another, proceeds,
and injury is done to the other as a direct and proximate conse-
quence of the act, however carefully done, the one who does the act
and caused the injury should, in all fairness, be required to compen-
sate the other for damage done.59
This principle is now embodied in the Restatement of Torts Section
519.60 The Restatement provides that a person carrying on an ul-
trahazardous activity is liable for injury to other persons, land, or chat-
tels resulting from that activity regardless of the degree of care
exercised by the person.6" While retaining the substance of the First
Restatement, the Restatement Second changed from an ultrahazardous
standard to a standard based on an abnormally dangerous activity.62
Whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is a question of law.63
The Restatement Second lists the following six factors to aid the court
in this determination:
(1) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(2) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(3) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(4) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(5) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and
(6) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.64
The greater number of these factors the court finds the more likely the
activity will be treated as abnormally dangerous. 6  A court, however,
may choose not to explicitly mention each of these factors preferring
instead to find the activity "obviously and plainly ultrahazardous,"
59. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 333-34, 270 P. 952, 955 (1928).
60. See, eg., Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 499, 190 P.2d 1, 7 (1948); Smith v. Lock-
heed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137 (1967); Gallin v. Poulou,
140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 645,295 P.2d 958, 962 (1956); Beck v. Bel Air Properties, Inc., 134 Cal. App.
2d 834, 841, 286 P.2d 503, 508-09 (1955). See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§519, 520
(1938).
61. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §519 (1938). The text of Section 519, in pertinent part, reads:
[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land
or chattels the actor should recognize is likely to be harmed by the unpreventable mis-
carriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity
ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.
62. See Recombinant DNA4, supra note 2, at 817; compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§519 (1977) with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §519 (1938).
63. 31 Cal. 2d at 496, 190 P.2d at 5; 247 Cal. App. 2d at 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 137. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §519, Comment a (1977).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (1977).
65. See id § 520, Comment f.
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without indicating the path taken to that conclusion.6 The criteria is
useful, however, as a framework to establish genetic engineering as an
abnormally dangerous activity.
1 The Applicability of the Restatement (Second) Factors to Genetic
Engineering
The first factor of the Restatement Second criteria requires a finding
of a high degree of risk of some harm to a person, land or chattels.67
The risks of genetic engineering are presently a matter of dispute as
scientists engage in a trial and error process of measuring the risks.6 8
There are, however, some facts known that establish a high degree of
risk in genetic engineering. First, the basic carrier, the bacteria E. coll,
is a normal inhabitant of the human intestinal system and is easily as-
similated into the body.69 Second, bacteria presents the greatest risk of
infection in humans. 70 Finally, evidence from virus and infectious dis-
ease research has established that there is a risk of escape and subse-
quent infection inherent in laboratory research.7' These three factors
taken together, seem to indicate that there is indeed a high risk of some
harm to people as a result of the nature of the modified DNA microor-
ganisms. Thus, the first factor of the Restatement Second criteria
seems to support a finding that genetic engineering is an abnormally
dangerous activity.
The second factor in the Restatement analysis requires a finding that
there is a likelihood of great harm.72 This does not require that the
resulting harm be catastrophic or in fact cause death; rather, it only
speaks of a likelihood of great harm. The California courts have found
a variety of activities abnormally dangerous because of the injuries or
property damage caused.73 In most cases, the courts have reached their
decision through the use of hindsight.74 This decision making process
creates difficulties in ascertaining what injury or property damage is
sufficiently great within the meaning of the Restatement. Past decisions
66. See Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 654, 276 P.2d 92, 100 (1954).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520(a) (1977).
68. See note 29 supra.
69. See note 29 supra.
70. See note 52 supra.
71. See note 52 supra.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520(b) (1977).
73. See, e.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumigation with hydro-
cyanic acid gas); Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928) (oil well
blowout); Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967)
(rocket engine testing); McKenna v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 104 Cal. App. 538, 286 P. 445 (1930)
(blasting).
74. See note 73 supra. This same approach has been applied in strict products liability cases,
see Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978).
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in California have found damage to a water well, 75 illness due to a
fumigation gas,76 and damage to property due to the use of explosives
to be sufficiently great harm.7 7 The decisions of the courts, however,
seem to be based on the knowledge of the actor that an injury may
result regardless of the care exercised7" and on the unusual nature of
the activity involved.7 9 Genetic engineering would probably be consid-
ered more unusual than either the use of explosives or the application
of a fumigation gas. As noted previously, the researchers do have, or
should be held to have, knowledge that an injury may result regardless
of the care exercised." Thus, this second factor in the Restatement
criteria seems to support a finding that genetic engineering is an abnor-
mally dangerous activity.
The next step in the analysis requires a finding that the risk of injury
cannot be el"fiinated by the exercise of reasonable care." The stan-
dard of reasonable care at the present time appears to be the Guide-
lines of the National Institutes of Health82 (hereinafter referred to as
NIH Guidelines), first promulgated in 1976.83 When a dangerous ac-
tivity is involved the standard of care should be relatively high; 4
whether the NIH Guidelines constitute a sufficient standard is difficult
to ascertain considering their short duration and the brief period of
time science has been involved in genetic research of this type.85 Since
their adoption, however, the NIH Guidelines have been relaxed three
times 6 and are constantly being modified to exclude certain experi-
75. See 205 Cal. at 333-34, 270 P. at 955.
76. See 31 Cal. 2d at 498, 190 P.2d at 6-7.
77. See 104 Cal. App. 538, 286 P. 445. But see Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lumber Co., 152
Cal. 500, 93 P. 82 (1907). See generally WrrKni, supra note 16, at §§803, 804, 805.
78. See 205 Cal. at 333-34, 270 P. at 955. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520
(1977).
79. See 31 Cal. 2d at 500, 190 P.2d at 8; 247 Cal. App. 2d at 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 137. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (1977).
80. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520(c) (1977).
82. See 45 Fed. Reg. 6724 (1980).
83. 41 Fed. Reg. 27911 (1976). See Recombinant DNA4, supra note 2, at 794-98. The Guide-
lines prescribe levels of containment for different classifications of experimental host cells. 45 Fed.
Reg. 6725-6732 (1980). This two-tiered system is designed to provide two different safety systems.
Id at 6730. See Recombinant DNA, supra note 2, at 795-96. The Guidelines, however, only apply
to those researchers receiving NIH funds and those who voluntarily choose to comply. 45 Fed.
Reg. 6746 (1980).
In two recent cases, scientists who were receiving NIH funds lost their funding for violating the
Guidelines. The scientists soon found other sources of funding with one of the many private
companies involved in DNA research. See San Francisco Chronicle, May 29, 1981, at 1, col. 5;
Mar. 23, 1981, at 7, col. 5.
It is also interesting to note that NIH is considering ending the Guidelines altogether. See San
Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 25, 1981, at 30, col. 1.
84. See Ambriz v. Petrolane Ltd., 49 Cal. 2d 470, 477, 319 P.2d 1, 5 (1957).
85. See generally Recombinant DNA4, supra note 2, at 797.
86. Compare 45 Fed. Reg. 6724 (1980) with 43 Fed. Reg. 60107 (1978); compare 43 Fed. Reg.
60107 (1978) with 41 Fed. Reg. 27911 (1970).
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ments or to waive various requirements for specified experiments. 87
Some scientists argue that since no accidents have occurred under the
NIH Guidelines reasonable care has eliminated the risk.8 8 This con-
clusion appears inaccurate for a number of reasons. First, these guide-
lines are drawn up by the very scientists performing the research;8 9
apparently, the regulations have been relaxed because the scientists are
seeking to expand their research with minimal interference. 90 In addi-
tion, compliance with these guidelines is voluntary and any enforce-
ment is carried out by committees composed of the researcher's peers.9'
The NIH Guidelines are, therefore, of dubious quality as a standard
against which to measure reasonable care. Assuming, however, that
the scientist complies with all the NIH Guidelines and has exercised
reasonable care in all other respects, this may not eliminate the risk.
Bacteria are capable-of independent motion, as are other organisms
and animals used in the experiments, and even the most careful scien-
tist may not be able adequately to contain the movements of these or-
ganisms. There is also evidence from research with viruses and
chemicals that escape is possible regardless of the efforts of the scien-
tist.92 The presence of an unavoidable risk of this sort in genetic engi-
neering is precisely the risk the Restatement Second addresses.93 Thus,
the third factor of the Restatement also supports the conclusion that
DNA research is an abnormally dangerous activity.
The fourth factor in the Restatement Second criteria looks to
whether an activity is a matter of common usage.94 An activity is a
matter of common usage if the activity is customarily carried on by
many people in the community.95 Genetic engineering, however, is
87. See note 18 supra.
88. Grobstein, supra note 14, at 1184.
89. See generally Swazey, Sorenson, and Wong, Risks and Benefts, Rights and Responsibili-
ties: History of the Recombinant DNA1 Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1036-53
(1978).
90. Cf. 46 Fed. Reg. 16452, 17994 (1981) (actions taken by NIH to allow experiments at a
lower containment level than was originally established).
91. 45 Fed. Reg. 6746 (1980). There are at least two states, however, which have made com-
pliance mandatory. See MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. §§898-910 (1980); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§3220-3223 (1980).
92. See McGarity, supra note 29, at 190-93; Genetic Manipulation, supra note 2, at 205. But
see Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1135-36.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520, Comment h (1977).
94. Id §520(d). See Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 498, 190 P.2d 1, 7 (1948).
95. The California courts have held the following not to be matters of common usage: Luth-
ringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumigation with hydrocyanic gas); Green v.
General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928) (oil well blowouts); Smith v. Lockheed
Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967) (testing of a rocket engine); Mc-
Kenna v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 104 Cal. App. 538, 286 P. 445 (1930) (blasting in a residential
area). Contrast the above with the following activities found to be matters of common usage:
Ramsey v. Marutamaya Ogatsu Fireworks Co. Ltd., 72 Cal. App. 3d 516, 140 Cal. Rptr. 247
(1977) (fireworks); Clark v. DiPrima, 241 Cal. App. 2d 823, 51 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1966) (irrigation
water); Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 295 P.2d 958 (1956) (garage construction); Beck v.
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carried on by a relatively small number of highly trained scientists;96
although there is some suggestion that high school students will soon be
able to splice together DNA molecules in their high school laborato-
ries,97 the infrequency with which DNA research presently occurs sup-
ports the proposition that genetic engineering is not a matter of
common usage.
The fifth criterion in the Restatement looks to the appropriateness of
the place where the activity is being conducted.98 From a narrow per-
spective, a laboratory seems to be an appropriate place to carry out
genetic research.99 The courts, however, do not take such a narrow
view when looking at the location of the activity.1"0 Instead, a court
will examine the area in which the activity occurs. 101 Thus, the use of
explosives in a residential community is considered abnormally dan-
gerous while blasting in an isolated area would probably not be.' 02 In
addition, some courts have, in unusual circumstances, found an activ-
ity abnormally dangerous even though the activity appeared to have
been carried on in the most appropriate place.10 Genetic engineering
is carried on in the laboratories of large universities and private busi-
nesses. Almost all of these laboratories are located in or near popula-
tion centers where there is a higher probability of someone coming in
contact with an escaped microorganism."°4 Therefore, genetic engi-
neering appears to be analogous to the use of explosives in a residential
area because the genetic laboratories are in a location likely to cause
harm. As a result, the location of genetic engineering laboratories near
population centers should be held to be an inappropriate place under
the criteria established by the Restatement Second.
The sixth and final factor of the Restatement test requires a court to
weigh the value of the activity to the community against the risks
presented to that community. 0 As discussed earlier, the potential
benefits of DNA research are staggering."°6 There are, however, only a
Bel Air Properties, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 286 P.2d 503 (1955) (earth moving); Boyd v. White,
128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954) (aviation).
96. Accord, 31 Cal. 2d at 498, 190 P.2d at 7.
97. See generaly Fletcher, supra, at 1133.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520(e) (1977).
99. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 1362.
100. See note 79 supra.
101. See note 73 supra.
102. See 247 Cal. App. 2d at 786-87, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 138. Compare McKenna v. Pacific Elec.
Ry. Co., 104 Cal. App. 538, 543, 246 P. 445, 446 (1930) with Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lumber
Co., 152 Cal. 500, 504, 93 P. 82, 84 (1907).
103. See 247 Cal. App. 2d at 786-87, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
104. See note 8 supra.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(6) (1977).
106. See note 7 supra.
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few cases where these potentials have been realized. 107 In weighing the
value of the current risks, however, the court should take into consider-
ation the future of DNA research. Since there is a possibility that ge-
netic research may save many lives and alleviate much suffering, this
should weigh heavily in favor of continued research. l08 In this way,
DNA research is similar to the research that eventually led to the elimi-
nation of small pox and, on that basis, probably should continue.
The position of genetic engineering today can be analogized to the
situation of the airplane in the first half of the twentieth century. 10 9
The courts, because of the uncertainty over the risks involved in air
travel, treated the airplane as an abnormally dangerous activity."10 As
the safety record of air travel lengthened, the courts slowly shifted
away from this position and today the airplane is not considered ul-
trahazardous.11' A similar approach should apply to genetic research
in light of the uncertain nature of the risk involved; a court should
weigh these risks heavily until a safety record is established. By doing
this, the court has flexibility to modify later the application of strict
liability. At the same time, however, the courts will be able to protect
the public from the risks currently ascertainable. Thus, presently, the
final factor in the Restatement Second criteria supports a finding that
genetic engineering is an abnormally dangerous activity.
2. Balancing the Restatement (Second) Factors
Neither the Restatement view nor the California courts require all
these factors be present to find an activity abnormally dangerous as a
matter of law.' 2  The California Supreme Court, in Luthringer v.
Moore,'13 held that an activity may be ultrahazardous for any one of
three reasons: the instrumentality used to carry on the activity; the na-
107. See note 7 supra. Even some of the potentials that have been realized are of dubious
quality. Recent evidence has indicated, for example, that genetically engineered and produced
interferon produces a positive response in only 25-40 percent of the patients treated with it. In
addition, the substance has a variety of side-effects not unlike the side-effects in traditional chemo-
therapy treatments. The results, in fact, appear to be no more effective or painless than the tradi-
tional treatments. The problem is further complicated by new information that the human body
produces 8 to 10 different types of interferon and science does not know yet which of these is or
will be the most effective against cancer. See Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1981, at 6, col. I. But see Wall
St. J., June 19, 1981, at 35, col. 5 in which the Department of Agriculture announced that a geneti-
cally engineered and produced vaccine has been successfully developed that will fight hoof and
mouth disease in livestock.
108. To date, however, genetic engineering has not resulted in any life saving discoveries. See
notes 7 and 107 supra.
109. See generall, WrniN, supra note 16, at §807(l).
110. See id
111. In California, this change was announced in Boyd v. Mhile, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 655,
276 P.2d 92, 100 (1954). See generall, WnrKmN, supra note 16, at §807(2).
112. See Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 498-99, 190 P.2d 1, 7 (1948); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs §520, Comment f (1977).
113. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
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ture of the subject matter; or the condition which the activity creates. "4
Similarly, the Restatement asks if the risk created is so unusual, due to
its magnitude or the circumstances surrounding it, to justify the imposi-
tion of strict liability." 5 An "'important factor is that certain activities
under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the public generally,
and of such relative frequent occurrence, that it may well call for strict
liability as the best public policy.' 16 In light of this statement, the
unusual nature of genetic engineering, and the analysis under the Re-
statement Second criteria, genetic engineering appears to qualify as an
abnormally dangerous activity for which strict liability should apply.
The inquiry, however, does not end here because, as mentioned before,
the injured party is required to show that the injury was caused by the
abnormally dangerous activity or by the dangerous animal.
THE EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS OF CAUSATION
An injured party faces two major evidentiary problems in a genetic
engineering accident situation. First, the plaintiff must establish that
the injury claimed was caused by a genetically engineered microorga-
nism. Thereafter, the plaintiff must prove a reasonable causal connec-
tion between the injury suffered and the acts of the defendants." 7 The
inability of the plaintiff to bring forth sufficient evidence establishing
these two factors would prove fatal to the plaintiff's lawsuit because the
courts have stated that the imposition of strict liability does not make
the defendant an insurer against all the ills of society.118 Therefore, to
prevent the researcher from becoming an insurer against any illness
suffered by a neighbor of the laboratory, the plaintiff must establish
these two causal factors.
In a genetic engineering accident case, these two evidentiary obsta-
cles may be very difficult to overcome because real, concrete evidence
114. Id at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §520, Comment f (1977).
116. Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137
(1967).
117. There is one further causal question, albeit beyond the scope of this comment, present in
a genetic engineering accident case. Imagine a situation when four laboratory workers are ex-
posed to a DNA modified microorganism while at work in the laboratory on a Friday afternoon.
Each worker goes off to a weekend away from home; the first going to New York, the second two
to a conference in San Francisco, and the fourth to a professional sporting event. As a result, each
of the four comes in contact with hundreds of people, spreading the mutant strain to thousands,
possibly millions. If the laboratory were required to shoulder the responsibility for all of the
injured people, it is quite likely that it would be put out of business and no one would receive a
meaningful recovery.
In order to insure that such a drastic result does not occur, it might be appropriate to provide a
statutory limitation on the total amount that can be recovered. This comment, however, takes no
position on the need for such a statute, leaving the discussion to another author.
118. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133-34, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
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may be impossible to find.119 This section will analyze these two evi-
dentiary problems and the applicability of judicially created doctrines
designed to ease, but not to eliminate, the plaintiffs evidentiary burden
in related situations.1 20
A. The Burden of Proof
The judicial doctrines regarding the burden of proof are well devel-
oped in the areas of products liability, in negligence through the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, and, to a lesser extent, in the area of
abnormally dangerous activities. An analogy may be drawn from the
development of proof in these areas that may be helpful to an under-
standing of the evidentiary problems facing an injured plaintiff in a
genetic engineering accident case. Additionally, reliance by the party
on circumstantial evidence and the policy justifications advanced for
aiding the plaintiffs burden of proof will be examined as a method of
overcoming these evidentiary problems.
1. Analogy to Strict Products Liability
The doctrine of strict liability for defects in products was born in the
now famous concurring opinion of Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. 21 in 1944. Justice Traynor stated that public policy
demands that responsibility for injuries due to defective products, even
in the absence of negligence, be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health. l 2" From this the courts have de-
veloped doctrines regarding the burden of proof required to satisfy this
public policy.1 23 Thus, in a leading products liability case, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court stressed the importance of the development of the
allocation of the burden of proof in products liability since "one of the
principal purposes behind the strict products liability doctrine is to re-
lieve an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens
inherent in a negligence cause of action."124 The principal method em-
119. Since, for the most part, the organisms are very small, it is unlikely that an inexperienced
party could distinguish these altered organisms from normal organisms. In addition, unless the
illness suffered is severe, a party may not realize that a genetically altered microorganism could be
responsible.
120. E.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431,573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 237 (1978); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134-35, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 443 (1972) (shifting the burden of proof to the defendant upon the raising of a reason-
able inference of causation); Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 182, 134
Cal. Rptr. 895, 901 (1976); Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 780, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 128, 134 (1967) (allowing proof of causation circumstantially).
121. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
122. Id at 462, 150 P.2d at 440.
123. See note 120 supra.
124. 20 Cal. 3d at 431,573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. See Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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ployed to relieve the injured party of this onerous burden allows the
plaintiff to use circumstantial evidence to establish a reasonable infer-
ence that the injury was the result of the activity or product in ques-
tion.1 25 The courts look to the facts established by the plaintiff and ask
if a reasonable inference can be drawn from those facts that the injury
was due to the defendant's activity. 26 If reasonable minds may differ
as to whether the evidence establishes causation, the question must be
answered by the trier of fact. 27 On the other hand, if the inference is
based on mere speculation or conjecture, the court may find a want of
causation as a matter of law.1
28
In a genetic engineering case, the injured party should be required to
bring forward sufficient circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable
inference that the injury was caused by the defendant's research. As
illustrated below, this evidence may take many forms.
Probably the most persuasive evidence that could be introduced
would be the remains of a genetically altered microorganism. This
may be difficult because of the size of these organisms and the unlikeli-
hood that the injured party could distinguish an altered organism from
a normal one.12 9 The presence of the carrier of the altered DNA organ-
ism, such as a mouse, would serve the same purpose without these
problems. In the absence of this type of evidence, however, an injured
party must turn to less direct forms of evidence.
The introduction of expert testimony regarding the nature of the in-
jury and the likelihood that the injury was caused by a genetically al-
tered organism would be a good example of an indirect form of proof.
Expert testimony could possibly establish that there is no other con-
ceivable source of plaintiff's injury and, therefore, that there is a strong
probability that modified DNA organisms are responsible for the in-
jury. This type of evidence is not unlike the circumstantial evidence
introduced in products liability cases when the actual defective item
was destroyed.1 30 The injured party in the defective product case only
needs to foreclose the probability, to a reasonable degree of certainty,
125. See, eg., 65 Cal. App. 3d at 177, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 901; 247 Cal. App. 2d at 780, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 134.
126. See 65 Cal. App. 3d at 182, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 901; 247 Cal. App. 2d at 780, 56 Cal. Rptr. at
134.
127. See note 124 supra.
128. See 247 Cal. App. 2d at 780, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
129. See note 119 supra.
130. In a products liability case the plaintiff establishes: (1) how the item was acquired; (2)
that the product was used in the manner in which it was intended to be used, and (3) that the
plaintiff suffered an injury that resulted from the use of the product. From these three factors a
reasonable inference is created that the product was defective before the plaintiff purchased the
product. See Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 141, 501 P.2d 1163, 1166-67, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443,
446-47 (1972); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 13d 465, 475, 467 P.2d 229, 236, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629, 636 (1970); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
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that any party other than the defendant was responsible. 131 Similarly,
the plaintiff in a genetic engineering situation ought to be required to
foreclose, through the use of circumstantial evidence, the probability
that the injury was due to anything other than a DNA modified micro-
organism.
2. Analogy to res ipsa loquitur
The doctrine of res #isa loquitur provides another useful analogy
when developing a case based on a genetic engineering mishap. Tradi-
tionally, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur gives rise to a presumption of
negligence upon a showing of the following three elements:
(1) the accident must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
under the exclusive control of the defendant;
(2) the accident must be of the type which ordinarily does not hap-
pen in the absence of negligence; and
(3) [the act] must not have been due to any voluntary act of the
plaintiff.1
32
While this comment does not address negligence as a cause of action,
the notion of creating a presumption regarding causation upon a show-
ing of certain facts may be very useful. Similar to res ipsa when the
plaintiff raises a rebuttable presumption of negligence, a plaintiff in a
genetic engineering situation, by showing that the injury is not likely to
have been caused by anything other than the defendant's research,
should gain the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the injury
suffered is due to a genetically altered microorganism. This does not
suggest, however, that the plaintiff will be raising a presumption of neg-
ligence; rather, the plaintiff is seeking to establish, with reasonable cer-
tainty, that it is more likely than not that a genetically engineered
microorganism is responsible for the illness. In addition, a plaintiff
may be able to introduce evidence that raises a reasonable inference
that the microorganisms could have escaped only from a nearby ge-
netic engineering laboratory. This should give rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a microorganism did indeed escape from a genetic
laboratory. Upon establishing these two presumptions, one of causa-
tion and one of the escape, the court should shift the burden of proof to
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 519,
109 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (1973).
131. See generally Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
132. B. WiTKiN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §260 (2d ed. 1966). See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 385, 482 P.2d 681, 683, 93 CaL Rptr. 769, 773 (1971) (discussing how res 6vsa
loquitur can be used in a products liability case).
The doctrine of res Opsa loquitur in a genetic engineering accident situation was discussed and
dismissed in Recombinant DNA, supra note 2, at 814.
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the defendant, allowing the defendant to introduce evidence to rebut
these presumptions. As in products liability actions, this does not re-
quire that the defendant prove non-causation, but only that the defend-
ant introduce sufficient evidence to put the plaintiffs evidence in
doubt.'33 The causation question is then decided by the trier of fact.
3. Policy Justqfcations for Shfting the Burden of Proof
to the Defendant
The courts have advanced a number of reasons for shifting the bur-
den of proof to the defendant. In Cronin v. JB.E. Olson Corp. ,' a
leading products liability case, the court stated that the
very purpose of our pioneering efforts in this field was to relieve the
plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence...
remedies, and thereby 'to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers."1
35
In the more recent decision of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. ,136 the
California Supreme Court pointed out that the party seeking to escape
liability for an injury proximately caused by the product design, using a
cost-benefit analysis, should bear the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the product should not be judged defective.' 37 And in Cho v.
Kempler,138 the court stated, "the requirement for explanation is not
too great a burden to impose upon those who wield the instruments of
injury and whose due care is vital to life itself."' 139 These opinions es-
tablish that the California courts do not believe that shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant is too heavy a burden to place on the defend-
ant in appropriate circumstances. 40
In addition, some courts justify shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant on the notion that the defendant may have superior knowl-
edge that would enable him to establish a lack of causation.' 4 ' Simi-
larly, the defendant may have access to information to which plaintiff
does not.' 42 For instance, the court may shift the burden of proof re-
garding causation in situations when the defendant may be able to
prove that he did not or could not have manufactured the injury caus-
133. See generaly B. WrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §260A (2d ed. 1966 & Supp. 1977).
134. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
135. Id at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
136. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
137. Id at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
138. 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1960).
139. Id at 348, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
140. See notes 134, 136, 138 supra.
141. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 598, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 136 (1980); 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. See generally B. WrrmN,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §262 (2d ed. 1966).
142. See note 141 supra.
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ing substance. 143
The rationale behind the shifting of the burden to the best risk taker
was explained in Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. 144 where the court
pointed out that since the defendant was engaged in an enterprise for
profit, the defendant was in the best position to spread the loss among
the members of the public. 45 The court believed that there was no
basis in reason or in justice requiring an innocent party to bear the loss
when that loss should be more properly charged against our complex
and dangerous society.' 46 Similarly, in the area of products liability,
the courts have emphasized that the cost of injury to the innocent party
may be overwhelming and needless since the risk of loss can be insured
against by the manufacturer as a cost of doing business.147 The para-
mount policy these decisions seek to promote is to protect otherwise
defenseless victims and to spread throughout society the cost of com-
pensating them for their injuries. 148 This same essential rationale has
been expressed in cases involving animals with dangerous propensi-
ties 149 and is summed up by the Restatement of Torts as follows: "The
defendant's enterprise, in other words, is required to pay its way by
compensating for the harm it causes, because of its special, abnormal
and dangerous character."' 151
The purpose of strict liability, to allocate the burden of harm in cir-
cumstances when damage of some sort is virtually inevitable, would be
served by finding genetic engineering accidents subject to strict liabil-
ity.151 The unusual and dangerous nature of the activity makes DNA
research much like the escape of poisonous gas which was held to be
the subject of strict liability in Luthringer v. Moore."2 Indeed, the po-
tential for profits from genetic engineering places DNA research within
the reasoning of Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. "I and the products
liability cases.'5 4 Similarly, the defendant scientist, intimately involved
with DNA research, will have superior knowledge as against an unso-
143. See 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (1980). See generally Ybarra
v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
144. 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967).
145. Id at 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
146. Id
147. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251 n.5, 466 P.2d 722, 725 n.5, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181
n.5 (1970).
148. Id at 251, 466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
149. Williams v. River Lakes Ranch Dev. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 496, 507, 116 Cal. Rptr. 200,
207 (1974).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §519, Comment d (1977).
151. See id See generalo, PROSSER, supra note 23, at 494; WITKIN, supra note 16, at §799.
152. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 500, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (1948).
153. 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137 (1967).
154. See, eg., Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 134 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1976).
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phisticated plaintiff, 1 55 and is, therefore, in a better position to deal
with the burden of proof on the causation issue. Therefore, the courts
should not hesitate to apply the evidentiary doctrines that allow the
shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant.
B. The Proper Defendant
Once the plaintiff is able to determine that his injury is the result of
DNA research, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants chosen
are the parties responsible for that injury. Additionally, if the party is
injured by an act of a governmental entity he must overcome the gov-
ernmental defense of sovereign immunity, a significant obstacle to
compensation.
Under California law, the injured party is required to establish a rea-
sonable causal connection between the activity of the defendant and
the harm suffered.156 The California Supreme Court, in Sindell v. Ab-
bott Laboratories,"5 7 has apparently established an outer limit as to
what constitutes this reasonable causal connection. In that case, a wo-
man whose mother had taken the drug diethlstilbestrol (commonly
known as DES) was allowed to pursue a cause of action against five
drug manufacturers. The court reasoned that if the five manufacturers
had supplied the majority of the DES at the time the mother had taken
the drug, this fact would establish a sufficient connection between the
injuries sustained and the acts of the defendants. 15  In an area with
more than one source of genetic engineering activity, when the plaintiff
can establish a connection in time and distance to these multiple
sources of DNA research, the Sindell reasoning may be successfully
applied to shift the burden of proof to the defendant manufacturers
since they are in a better position to deal with the elements of proof of a
causal connection. The primary reason for applying the Sindell reason-
able connection reasoning is based on the likelihood that the injury-
causing microorganisms escaped from one of the laboratories. This
provides some protection to the defendants since the individual defend-
ants may be dropped from the lawsuit when they introduce evidence
indicating that they could not be responsible for theplaintiff's injury. 9
For example, the particular defendant could show that he was not do-
155. See text accompanying notes 141-143 supra.
156. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 600, 607 P.2d 924, 930, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 138 (1980); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 82, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733
(1978).
157. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
158. Id at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
159. Id
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ing DNA research at the time in question or that the research that was
occurring could not possibly result in the injury claimed.
When there is only one laboratory in the area, the Sindell rationale is
inapplicable and the injured party must establish a reasonable connec-
tion between the injuries sustained and the activities of that laboratory.
The court, however, should allow the use of the evidentiary presump-
tions discussed above for this purpose as well.' 60
In general, a plaintiff is entitled to control his case by "proceeding
against the party or parties whom he feels to be most clearly liable."' 16'
In a genetic engineering "accident" the parties most clearly liable seem
to be the scientist and his employer. An employer is liable for the torts
of his employees committed in the scope of their employment under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.162 An employee is always liable for his
own torts regardless of whether the employer is liable as well. 163 These
principles are equally applicable to strict liability situations, both ul-
trahazardous activities and dangerous animals and thus, recovery may
be sought from both the individual researcher and his employer.
L The Defense of Governmental Immunity
Much presently ongoing genetic research is being carried out in
state-sponsored and state-owned facilities. For instance, both the Uni-
versities of California at Davis' 64 and at Los Angeles1 65 are currently
engaged in genetic research. The University of California is also part
owner of one of the first patents issued for a DNA research discov-
ery.166 This state involvement makes it necessary for an injured party
to overcome the defense of sovereign immunity if a cause of action
against a government sponsored laboratory is to be successful.
In California all government tort liability is governed by statute 67
contained in the California Tort Claims Act.168  The California
160. See text accompanying notes 121-133 supra.
161. Balding v. D.B. Stutsman, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 559, 562, 54 Cal. Rptr. 717, 719 (1966)
(citing Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 551-52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 (1962)). See also
General Electric Co. v. State of Cal. ex rel Dep't. Pub. Works, 32 Cal. App. 3d 918, 926, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 543, 548 (1973).
162. See generally 1 B. WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Agency and Employment
§155 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1980).
163. CAL. CIv. CODE §2343(3). See generally WInTN, supra note 16, at §24.
164. See Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1981, at 48, col. 1.
165. See San Francisco Chronicle, May 29, 1981, at 1, col. 5. See also San Francisco Chroni-
cle, Mar. 23, 1981, at 7, col. 5 (University of California, San Diego); Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1980, at 1,
coL 6 (University of California, San Francisco).
166. See San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 4, 1980, at 1, coL 1; Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1980, at 1, col.
6; Dec. 4, 1980, at 12, col. 3. The other party to the patent is Stanford University.
167. Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 803, 808, 75 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (1969).
168. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§810-996.6. For a general presentation of the California Torts
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Supreme Court severely limited the defense of sovereign immunity in
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District'69 and Lipman v. Brisbane Elemen-
tary SchoolDistrict17 ° deciding that "[t]he rule of governmental immu-
nity for tort is an anachronism, without rational basis, and has existed
only by the force of inertia."'' Since these two cases, California courts
have agreed that "in governmental tort cases, 'the rule is liability, im-
munity is the exception'.' 7 2 The enactment of the Tort Claims Act in
1963 did not reinstate tort immunity. 73 Rather, the Tort Claims Act
was intended to accomplish the following:
(a) to make public entities liable when their employees were liable;
(b) to continue the immunity granted to public employees for discre-
tionary acts within the scope of their employment; and (c) to create
liability when injury was caused by failure to perform a mandatory
duty. 17
4
From this, one may infer that if the employee would be liable for his
act, the government institution employing him will also be liable. 175
This liability only arises, however, if the action of the employee would
have created a cause of action against the employee notwithstanding
the Tort Claims Act. 176 The statute also provides that when a public
employee is granted immunity by statute, the public entity will also be
imm~une. 177
Under the California statutes, an employee is not liable for any in-
jury resulting from the exercise of discretion vested in that employee,
regardless of whether that discretion was abused. 178 California courts
have interpreted "discretionary act" narrowly since nearly all acts by a
Claims Act, see generally CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY
(1980).
169. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
170. 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
171. 55 Cal. 2d at 216, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
172. Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 692, 484 P.2d 93, 98, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426
(1971); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 798, 447 P.2d 352, 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 251 (1968);
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 219, 359 P.2d 457, 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. 59, 64
(1961); Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 284, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312, 313 (1967).
173. Elson v. Public Util. Comm'n, 51 Cal. App. 3d 577, 587, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 311 (1975).
174. Id
175. The statute provides:
(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission
would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee
or his personal representative.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury
resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee
is immune from liability.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §815.2.
176. Id §815.2(b).
177. Id §§815.2(b), 820.2.
178. Id §820.2.
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government employee involve some discretion. 79 The California
Supreme Court has defined discretionary activity as that activity re-
lated to basic policy decisions; those sometimes characterized as the
planning, as opposed to the operational, level of decision making.18 0
In order for an injured plaintiff to recover from a governmental en-
tity, he must establish that the genetic researcher is not protected by
this discretionary immunity doctrine. When a government entity
makes the decision to commence genetic research, this seems to be a
basic policy decision involving planning level decision making. This
initial decision, therefore, would probably be exempt from suit even if
the decision to commence DNA research were poorly made."' The
implementation of the research, on the other hand, involves the opera-
tional level of decision making.' 82 The day-to-day performance of this
research admittedly involves some discretion but these decisions are
not basic policy decisions 8 3 and thus, "public policy demands. . .that
government be held to the same standard of care the law requires of its
private citizens in the performance of duties imposed by law or as-
sumed."' 84 Thus, the governmental entity should be judged by the
same standards as a private research entity in a genetic engineering
accident situation.
A second rationale put forward for the discretionary act immunity is
that fear of reprisal for carrying out governmental duties should not
hamper the decision making activities of public employees.' 8- In a ge-
netic research situation, however, the government employee is not be-
ing exposed to any greater liability than the private scientist; the
reprisal would not be for the decision making but for the day-to-day
performance of an abnormally dangerous activity with full knowledge
of the risks inherent in that type of endeavor. Thus, the imposition of
strict liability does not hamper the discretionary act immunity ration-
ale.
The imposition of liability on a public entity also serves the risk
spreading rationale since
179. See, e.g., Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 693, 484 P.2d 93, 99, 94 Cal. Rptr.
421, 427 (1971); Wheeler v. County of San Bernadino, 76 Cal. App. 3d 841, 848, 143 Cal. Rptr.
295, 300 (1978); Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 803, 818, 75 Cal. Rptr. 240, 249-
50 (1969).
180. See 4 Cal. 3d at 693, 484 P.2d at 99, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (1971); Johnson v. State of
California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793-94, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248 (1968).
181. See CAL. Gov'r CODE §820.2. See also McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252,
261, 449 P.2d 453, 460, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389, 396 (1969).
182. See 70 Cal. 2d at 261, 449 P.2d at 460, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
183. See note 179 supra.
184. Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 290, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312, 317 (1967).
185. See 69 Cal. 2d at 792, 447 P.2d at 359-60, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48; Lipman v. Brisbane
Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224,229,359 P.2d 465,467, 11 Cal. Rptr. 9T,99, (1961); Elson
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 51 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584-85, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (1975).
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[i]t would be unjust in some circumstances to require an individual
injured by official wrongdoing to bear the burden of his loss rather
than distribute [the loss] through the community. ... Unless the
Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal
goal of compensating injured parties for damages ...must pre-
vail. 186
In Muskopfv. Corning Hosp. Dit. , 187 the fact that the defendant hospi-
tal was "an entity legally and financially capable of satisfying a judg-
ment" was one of the reasons that convinced the court to restrict the
availability of sovereign immunity in California. 8 s By the same token,
if the state university owns and is licensing a patent, that university has
also become an entity "financially capable of satisfying a judgment."' 18 9
In addition, a strong argument can be made that if this research is sig-
nificantly beneficial to the human race, spreading the risk among all
taxpayers is a better option than denying the innocent plaintiff recov-
ery.190 In sum, if the government chooses to engage in genetic engi-
neering, the Tort Claims Act, as it has been interpreted by the courts,
should provide a basis for holding the governmental entity financially
responsible. Thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it exists to-
day in California, should not serve to immunize a governmental entity
engaged in genetic research.191
CONCLUSION
This comment has taken the view that an accident involving genetic
engineering should be governed by the principles of strict liability as
provided for animals with known dangerous propensities 92 or for ab-
normally dangerous activities.193 Due to the unusual nature of DNA
research and the inherent risks involved, this comment has suggested
that the evidentiary doctrines that allow the shifting of the burden of
proof to the defendant should be available to the innocent, injured
party to ease, but not to eliminate, the difficulties involved in the proof
of causation. 194 These evidentiary doctrines will aid a plaintiff in estab-
186. 4 Cal. 3d at 692, 484 P.2d at 98, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 426 (1971).
187. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
188. Id at 216, 359 P.2d at 459, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
189. Id
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520, Comment h (1977).
191. There has been some support for a statutory limit on liability for genetic engineering
accidents patterned after the Price Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §2110. Unlike the situation of nuclear
power, however, where from the beginning, the awesome destructive power of a nuclear accident
stifled the development of nuclear power, the risks in genetic engineering have not stifled growth.
See notes 6, 8 supra. But, as noted earlier, such a statutory limit may be necessary to achieve
meaningful recoveries. See note 117 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 32-58 supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 59-116 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 117-163 supra.
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lishing that his injury is the result of DNA research activity and, simi-
larly, they will aid the plaintiff in identifying the source of the harm.
Finally, this comment has asserted that research conducted by a gov-
ernmental entity should not be protected by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity under California law.' 95
This comment does not suggest, however, that this research be dis-
continued. The utility of genetic research may be such that the defend-
ant is socially justified in continuing. 196 The inherent risk, however,
requires that the research be carried on at the peril of the defendant
rather than at the expense of an innocent person injured as a result of
the activity. 197 Simply stated, the defendant researcher engaged in an
activity of this sort must pay his own way. 198 This comment has taken
the view that the best way to achieve this goal is to impose strict liabil-
ity on the party doing the research. In this way, the loss is spread
among the public as a cost of doing business and the innocent party is
not required to bear the entire cost of an injury best chargeable against
a complex and dangerous society. 199
David . Gilmore
195. See text accompanying notes 164-191 supra.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §520, Comment h (1977).
197. See text accompanying notes 134-155 supra.
198. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §519, Comment d (1977).
199. Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137
(1967).
